Checkpointing algorithms and fault prediction by Aupy, Guillaume et al.
Checkpointing algorithms and fault prediction
Guillaume Aupy, Yves Robert, Fre´de´ric Vivien, Dounia Zaidouni
To cite this version:
Guillaume Aupy, Yves Robert, Fre´de´ric Vivien, Dounia Zaidouni. Checkpointing algorithms
and fault prediction. [Research Report] RR-8237, INRIA. 2013, pp.8237. <hal-00788313v2>
HAL Id: hal-00788313
https://hal.inria.fr/hal-00788313v2
Submitted on 1 Nov 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
IS
S
N
02
49
-6
39
9
IS
R
N
IN
R
IA
/R
R
--
82
37
--
FR
+E
N
G
RESEARCH
REPORT
N° 8237
November 2013
Project-Team ROMA
Checkpointing
algorithms and fault
prediction
Guillaume Aupy, Yves Robert, Frédéric Vivien, Dounia Zaidouni

RESEARCH CENTRE
GRENOBLE – RHÔNE-ALPES
Inovallée
655 avenue de l’Europe Montbonnot
38334 Saint Ismier Cedex
Checkpointing algorithms and fault prediction
Guillaume Aupy∗, Yves Robert∗†‡, Fre´de´ric Vivien§∗, Dounia
Zaidouni§∗
Project-Team ROMA
Research Report n° 8237 — November 2013 — 35 pages
Abstract: This paper deals with the impact of fault prediction techniques on checkpointing
strategies. We extend the classical first-order analysis of Young and Daly in the presence of a
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E´tude de l’impact de la pre´diction de fautes sur
les strate´gies de protocoles de checkpoint
Re´sume´ : Ce travail conside`re l’impact des techniques de pre´diction de fautes
sur les strate´gies de protocoles de sauvegarde de points de reprise (checkpoints)
et de rede´marrage. Nous e´tendons l’analyse classique de Young en pre´sence
d’un syste`me de pre´diction de fautes, qui est caracte´rise´ par son rappel (taux de
pannes pre´vues sur nombre total de pannes) et par sa pre´cision (taux de vraies
pannes parmi le nombre total de pannes annonce´es). Dans ce travail, nous avons
pu obtenir la valeur optimale de la pe´riode de checkpoint (minimisant ainsi le
gaspillage de l’utilisation des ressources duˆ au couˆt de prise de ces points de
sauvegarde) dans diffe´rents sce´narios. Ce papier pose les fondations the´oriques
pour de futures expe´riences et une validation du mode`le.
Mots-cle´s : Tole´rance aux pannes, checkpoint, pre´diction, algorithmes, mode`le,
exascale
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, the most powerful High Performance Computing systems experience
about one fault per day [1, 2]. Consider the relative slopes describing the evolu-
tion of the reliability of individual components on one side, and the evolution of
the number of components on the other side: the reliability of an entire platform
is expected to decrease, due to probabilistic amplification, as its number of com-
ponents increases. Therefore, applications running on large computing systems
have to cope with platform faults. There are two main approaches. On the one
hand, applications can use fault-tolerance mechanisms such as checkpoint and
rollback in order to become resilient. On the other hand, system administrators
can try to predict where and when faults will strike. Although considerable
research has been devoted to fault predictors [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8], no predictor will
ever be able to predict every fault. Therefore, fault predictors will have to be
used in conjunction with fault-tolerance mechanisms.
In this paper, we assess the impact of fault prediction techniques on check-
pointing strategies. We assume to have jobs executing on a platform subject to
faults, and we let µ be the Mean Time Between Faults (MTBF) of the platform.
In the absence of fault prediction, the standard approach is to take periodic
checkpoints, each of length C, every period of duration T . In steady-state uti-
lization of the platform, the value Topt of T that minimizes the expected waste
of resource usage due to checkpointing is approximated as Topt =
√
2µC + C,
or Topt =
√
2(µ+R)C + C (where R is the duration of the recovery). The
former expression is the well-known Young’s formula [9], while the latter is due
to Daly [10].
Now, when some fault prediction mechanism is available, can we compute
a better checkpointing period to decrease the expected waste? and to what
extent? Critical parameters that characterize a fault prediction system are its
recall r, which is the fraction of faults that are indeed predicted, and its precision
p, which is the fraction of predictions that are correct (i.e., correspond to actual
faults). The major objective of this paper is to refine the expression of the
expected waste as a function of these new parameters, and to design efficient
checkpointing policies that take predictions into account. The key contributions
of this paper are:
• A refined first-order analysis in the absence of fault prediction. It leads
to similar performance to Young [9] and Daly [10] when faults follow an
Exponential distribution, and to better performance when faults follow a
Weibull distribution.
• The extension of this analysis to fault predictions, and the design of new
checkpointing policies that takes optimal decisions on whether and when
to take these predictions into account (or to ignore them).
• For policies where the decision to trust the predictor is taken with the
same probability throughout the checkpointing period, we show that we
should always trust the predictor, or never, depending upon platform and
predictor parameters.
• For policies where the decision to trust the predictor is taken with vari-
able probability during the checkpointing period, we show that we should
change strategy only once in the period, moving from never trusting the
predictor when the prediction arrives in the beginning of the period, to
always trusting the predictor when the prediction arrives later on in the
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period, and we determine the optimal break-even point.
• For all policies, we compute the optimal value of the checkpointing period
thereby designing optimal algorithms to minimize the waste when coupling
checkpointing with predictions.
• An extensive set of simulations that corroborates all mathematical deriva-
tions. These simulations are based on synthetic fault traces (for Exponen-
tial fault distributions, and for more realistic Weibull fault distributions)
and on log-based fault traces. In addition, they include exact prediction
dates and uncertainty intervals for these dates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first detail the framework
in Section 2. We revisit Young and Daly’s approach in Section 3. We provide
optimal algorithms to account for predictions in Section 4: we start with simpler
policies where the decision to trust the predictor is taken with the same proba-
bility throughout the checkpointing period (Section 4.1) before dealing with the
most general approach where the decision to trust the predictor is taken with
variable probability during the checkpointing period (Section 4.2). Section 5 is
devoted to simulations: we first describe the framework (Section 5.1) and then
discuss synthetic and log-based failure traces in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 respectively.
We discuss related work in Section 6. Finally, we provide concluding remarks
in Section 7.
p Predictor precision: proportion of true positives among the number of predicted faults
r Predictor recall: proportion of predicted faults among total number of faults
q Probability to trust the predictor
MTBF Mean Time Between Faults
N Number of processors in the platform
µ Platform MTBF
µind Individual MTBF
µP Rate of predicted faults
µNP Rate of unpredicted faults
µe Rate of events (predictions or unpredicted faults)
D Downtime
R Recovery time
C Duration of a regular checkpoint
Cp Duration of a proactive checkpoint
T Duration of a period
Table 1 – Table of main notations.
2 Framework
2.1 Checkpointing strategy
We consider a platform subject to faults. Our work is agnostic of the granularity
of the platform, which may consist either of a single processor, or of several pro-
cessors that work concurrently and use coordinated checkpointing. Checkpoints
are taken at regular intervals, or periods, of length T . We denote by C the du-
ration of a checkpoint (all checkpoints have same duration). By construction,
we must enforce that C ≤ T . When a fault strikes the platform, the application
RR n° 8237
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is lacking some resource for a certain period of time of length D, the downtime.
The downtime accounts for software rejuvenation (i.e., rebooting [11, 12]) or for
the replacement of the failed hardware component by a spare one. Then, the
application recovers from the last checkpoint. R denotes the duration of this
recovery time.
2.2 Fault predictor
A fault predictor is a mechanism that is able to predict that some faults will take
place, either at a certain point in time, or within some time-interval window.
In this paper, we assume that the predictor is able to provide exact predic-
tion dates, and to generate such predictions early enough so that a proactive
checkpoint can indeed be taken before the event.
The accuracy of the fault predictor is characterized by two quantities, the
recall and the precision. The recall r is the fraction of faults that are predicted
while the precision p is the fraction of fault predictions that are correct. Tra-
ditionally, one defines three types of events: (i) True positive events are faults
that the predictor has been able to predict (let TrueP be their number); (ii)
False positive events are fault predictions that did not materialize as actual
faults (let FalseP be their number); and (iii) False negative events are faults
that were not predicted (let FalseN be their number). With these definitions,
we have r = TruePTrueP+FalseN and p =
TrueP
TrueP+FalseP
.
Proactive checkpoints may have a different length Cp than regular check-
points of length C. In fact there are many scenarios. On the one hand, we
may well have Cp > C in scenarios where regular checkpoints are taken at time-
steps where the application memory footprint is minimal [13]; on the contrary,
proactive checkpoints are taken according to predictions that can take place
at arbitrary instants. On the other hand, we may have Cp < C in other sce-
narios [8], e.g., when the prediction is localized to a particular resource subset,
hence allowing for a smaller volume of checkpointed data.
To keep full generality, we deal with two checkpoint sizes in this paper: C
for periodic checkpoints, and Cp for proactive checkpoints (those taken upon
predictions).
In the literature, the lead time is the interval between the date at which the
prediction is made available, and the actual prediction date. While the lead
time is an important parameter, the shape of its distribution law is irrelevant to
the problem: either a fault is predicted at least Cp seconds in advance, and then
one can checkpoint just in time before the fault, or the prediction is useless! In
other words, predictions that come too late should be classified as unpredicted
faults whenever they materialize as actual faults, leading to a smaller value of
the predictor recall.
2.3 Fault rates
The key parameter is µ, the MTBF of the platform. If the platform is made of
N components whose individual MTBF is µind, then µ =
µind
N . This result is
true regardless of the fault distribution law1.
1For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof of this widely-used result in A. To the
best of our knowledge, no proof has been published in the literature yet.
RR n° 8237
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In addition to µ, the platform MTBF, let µP be the mean time between
predicted events (both true positive and false positive), and let µNP be the mean
time between unpredicted faults (false negative). Finally, we define the mean
time between events as µe (including all three event types). The relationships
between µ, µP, µNP, and µe are the following:
• Rate of unpredicted faults: 1µNP =
1−r
µ , since 1− r is the fraction of faults
that are unpredicted;
• Rate of predicted faults: rµ =
p
µP
, since r is the fraction of faults that are
predicted, and p is the fraction of fault predictions that are correct;
• Rate of events: 1µe =
1
µP
+ 1µNP , since events are either predictions (true
or false), or unpredicted faults.
2.4 Objective: waste minimization
The natural objective is to minimize the expectation of the total execution time,
makespan, of the application. Instead, in order to ease mathematical derivations,
we aim at minimizing the waste. The waste is the expected percentage of time
lost, or “wasted”, during the execution. In other words, the waste is the fraction
of time during which the platform is not doing useful work. This definition was
introduced by Wingstrom [14]. Obviously, the lower the waste, the lower the
expected makespan, and reciprocally. Hence the two objectives are strongly
related and minimizing one of them also minimizes the other.
3 Revisiting Daly’s first-order approximation
Young proposed in [9] a “first order approximation to the optimum checkpoint
interval”. Young’s formula was later refined by Daly [10] to take into account
the recovery time. We revisit their analysis using the notion of waste.
Let Timebase be the base time of the application without any overhead
(neither checkpoints nor faults). First, assume a fault-free execution of the
application with periodic checkpointing. In such an environment, during each
period of length T we take a checkpoint, which lasts for a time C, and only
T − C units of work are executed. Let TimeFF be the execution time of the
application in this setting. Following most works in the literature, we also take
a checkpoint at the end of the execution. The fault-free execution time TimeFF
is equal to the time needed to execute the whole application, Timebase, plus the
time taken by the checkpoints:
TimeFF = Timebase +NckptC (1)
where Nckpt is the number of checkpoints taken. We have
Nckpt =
⌈
Timebase
T − C
⌉
≈ Timebase
T − C
When discarding the ceiling function, we assume that the execution time is very
large with respect to the period or, symmetrically, that there are many periods
RR n° 8237
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during the execution. Plugging back the (approximated) value Nckpt =
Timebase
T−C ,
we derive that
TimeFF =
Timebase
T − C T (2)
The waste due to checkpointing in a fault-free execution, WasteFF, is de-
fined as the fraction of the execution time that does not contribute to the
progress of the application:
WasteFF =
TimeFF −Timebase
TimeFF
⇔ (1−WasteFF)TimeFF = Timebase
(3)
Combining Equations (2) and (3), we get:
WasteFF =
C
T
(4)
Now, let Timefinal denote the expected execution time of the application in
the presence of faults. This execution time can be divided into two parts: (i)
the execution of “chunks” of work of size T − C followed by their checkpoint;
and (ii) the time lost due to the faults. This decomposition is illustrated by
Figure 1. The first part of the execution time is equal to TimeFF. Let Nfaults
be the number of faults occurring during the execution, and let Tlost be the
average time lost per fault. Then,
Timefinal = TimeFF +Nfaults × Tlost (5)
On average, during a time Timefinal, Nfaults =
Timefinal
µ faults happen. We need
to estimate Tlost. The instants at which periods begin and at which faults strike
are independent. Therefore, the expected time elapsed between the completion
of the last checkpoint and a fault is T2 for all distribution laws, regardless of
their particular shape. We conclude that Tlost =
T
2 +D+R, because after each
fault there is a downtime and a recovery. This leads to:
Timefinal = TimeFF +
Timefinal
µ
×
(
D +R+
T
2
)
Let Wastefault be the fraction of the total execution time that is lost because
of faults:
Wastefault =
Timefinal −TimeFF
Timefinal
⇔ (1−Wastefault)Timefinal = TimeFF
(6)
We derive:
Wastefault =
1
µ
(
D +R+
T
2
)
. (7)
In [10], Daly uses the expression
Timefinal =
(
1 +Wastefault
)
TimeFF (8)
instead of Equation (6), which leads him to his well-known first-order formula
T =
√
2(µ+ (D +R))C + C (9)
RR n° 8237
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TimeFF =TimeFinal (1-WasteFail) TimeFinal ×WasteFail
TimeFinal
T -C C T -C C T -C C T -C C T -C C
T -C C T -C C T -C C T -C C T -C C
Figure 1 – An execution (top), and its re-ordering (bottom), to illustrate both
sources of waste. Blackened intervals correspond to work destroyed by faults,
downtimes, and recoveries.
Figure 1 explains why Equation (8) is not correct and should be replaced by
Equation (6). Indeed, the expected number of faults depends on the final time,
not on the time for a fault-free execution. We point out that Young [9] also
used Equation (8), but with D = R = 0. Equation (6) can be rewritten
Timefinal = TimeFF/ (1−Wastefault). Therefore, using Equation (8) instead
of Equation (6), in fact, is equivalent to write 11−Wastefault ≈ 1 + Wastefault
which is indeed a first-order approximation if Wastefault  1.
Now, let Waste denote the total waste:
Waste =
Timefinal −Timebase
Timefinal
(10)
Therefore
Waste = 1−Timebase
Timefinal
= 1−Timebase
TimeFF
TimeFF
Timefinal
= 1−(1−WasteFF)(1−Wastefault).
Altogether, we derive the final result:
Waste = WasteFF +Wastefault −WasteFFWastefault (11)
=
C
T
+
(
1− C
T
)
1
µ
(
D +R+
T
2
)
(12)
We obtain Waste = uT + v + wT where u = C
(
1 − D+Rµ
)
, v = D+R−C/2µ ,
and w = 12µ . Thus Waste is minimized for T =
√
u
w . The Refined First-Order
(RFO) formula for the optimal period is thus:
TRFO =
√
2(µ− (D +R))C (13)
It is interesting to point out why Equation (13) is a first-order approximation,
even for large jobs. Indeed, there are several restrictions to enforce for the
approach to be valid:
• We have stated that the expected number of faults during execution is
Nfaults =
Timefinal
µ , and that the expected time lost due to a fault is
Tlost =
T
2 . Both statements are true individually, but the expectation of a
product is the product of the expectations only if the random variables are
independent, which is not the case here because Timefinal depends upon
the failure inter-arrival times.
• In Equation (4), we have to enforce C ≤ T to have WasteFF ≤ 1
RR n° 8237
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• In Equation (7), we have to enforce D + R ≤ µ and to bound T in or-
der to have Wastefault ≤ 1. Intuitively, we need µ to be large enough
for Equation (7) to make sense. However, regardless of the value of the
individual MTBF µind, there is always a threshold in the number of com-
ponents N above which the platform MTBF µ = µindN becomes too small
for Equation (7) to be valid.
• Equation (7) is accurate only when two or more faults do not take place
within the same period. Although unlikely when µ is large in front of T ,
the possible occurrence of many faults during the same period cannot be
eliminated.
To ensure that the latter condition (at most a single fault per period) is met
with a high probability, we cap the length of the period: we enforce the condition
T ≤ αµ, where α is some tuning parameter chosen as follows. The number
of faults during a period of length T can be modeled as a Poisson process of
parameter β = Tµ . The probability of having k ≥ 0 faults is P (X = k) = β
k
k! e
−β ,
where X is the number of faults. Hence the probability of having two or more
faults is pi = P (X ≥ 2) = 1− (P (X = 0) + P (X = 1)) = 1− (1 + β)e−β . If we
assume α = 0.27 then pi ≤ 0.03, hence a valid approximation when bounding the
period range accordingly. Indeed, with such a conservative value for α, we have
overlapping faults for only 3% of the checkpointing segments in average, so that
the model is quite reliable. For consistency, we also enforce the same type of
bound on the checkpoint time, and on the downtime and recovery: C ≤ αµ and
D+R ≤ αµ. However, enforcing these constraints may lead to use a sub-optimal
period: it may well be the case that the optimal period
√
2(µ− (D +R))C of
Equation (13) does not belong to the admissible interval [C,αµ]. In that case,
the waste is minimized for one of the bounds of the admissible interval: this
is because, as seen from Equation (12), the waste is a convex function of the
period.
We conclude this discussion on a positive note. While capping the period,
and enforcing a lower bound on the MTBF, is mandatory for mathematical
rigor, simulations (see Section 5 for both Exponential and Weibull distributions)
show that actual job executions can always use the value from Equation (13),
accounting for multiple faults whenever they occur by re-executing the work
until success. The first-order model turns out to be surprisingly robust!
To the best of our knowledge, despite all the limitations above, there is no
better approach to estimate the waste due to checkpointing when dealing with
arbitrary fault distributions. However, assuming that faults obey an Exponen-
tial distribution, it is possible to use the memory-less property of this distri-
bution to provide more accurate results. A second-order approximation when
faults obey an Exponential distribution is given in Daly [10, Equation (20)] as
Timefinal = µe
R/µ(e
T
µ − 1)TimebaseT−C . In fact, in that case, the exact value of
Timefinal is provided in [15, 16] as Timefinal = (µ + D)e
R/µ(e
T
µ − 1)TimebaseT−C ,
and the optimal period is then 1+L(−e
−C
µ
−1
)
µ where L, the Lambert function, is
defined as L(z)eL(z) = z.
To assess the accuracy of the different first order approximations, we com-
pare the periods defined by Young’s formula [9], Daly’s formula [10], and Equa-
tion (13), to the optimal period, in the case of an Exponential distribution.
Results are reported in Table 2. To establish these results, we use the same
RR n° 8237
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parameters as in Section 5: C = R = 600 s, D = 60 s, and µind = 125 years.
Furthermore, to compute the optimal period, for each platform size we choose
the application size so that Timebase = 2 hours. One can observe in Table 2 that
the relative error for Daly’s period is slightly larger than the one for Young’s
period. In turn, the absolute value of the relative error for Young’s period is
slightly larger than the one for RFO. More importantly, when Young’s and
Daly’s formulas overestimate the period, RFO underestimates it. Table 2 does
not allow us to assess whether these differences are actually significant. However
we also report in Section 5.2 some simulations that show that Equation (13)
leads to smaller execution times for Weibull distributions than both classical
formulas (Tables 4 and 5).
N µ Young Daly RFO Optimal
210 3849609 68567 (0.5 %) 68573 (0.5 %) 67961 (-0.4 %) 68240
211 1924805 48660 (0.7 %) 48668 (0.7 %) 48052 (-0.6 %) 48320
212 962402 34584 (1.2 %) 34595 (1.2 %) 33972 (-0.6 %) 34189
213 481201 24630 (1.6 %) 24646 (1.7 %) 24014 (-0.9 %) 24231
214 240601 17592 (2.3 %) 17615 (2.5 %) 16968 (-1.3 %) 17194
215 120300 12615 (3.2 %) 12648 (3.5 %) 11982 (-1.9 %) 12218
216 60150 9096 (4.5 %) 9142 (5.1 %) 8449 (-2.9 %) 8701
217 30075 6608 (6.3 %) 6673 (7.4 %) 5941 (-4.4 %) 6214
218 15038 4848 (8.8 %) 4940 (10.8 %) 4154 (-6.8 %) 4458
219 7519 3604 (12.0 %) 3733 (16.0 %) 2869 (-10.8 %) 3218
Table 2 – Comparing periods produced by the different approximations with op-
timal value. Beside each period, we report its relative deviation to the optimal.
Each value is expressed in seconds.
4 Taking predictions into accounts
In this section, we present an analytical model to assess the impact of predictions
on periodic checkpointing strategies. As already mentioned, we consider the case
where the predictor is able to provide exact prediction dates, and to generate
such predictions at least Cp seconds in advance, so that a proactive checkpoint
of length Cp can indeed be taken before the event.
For the sake of clarity, we start with a simple algorithm (Section 4.1) which
we refine in Section 4.2. We then compute the value of the period that minimizes
the waste in Section 4.3.
4.1 Simple policy
In this section, we consider the following algorithm:
• While no fault prediction is available, checkpoints are taken periodically
with period T ;
• When a fault is predicted, there are two cases: either there is the possibility
to take a proactive checkpoint, or there is not enough time to do so,
because we are already checkpointing (see Figures 2(b) and 2(c)). In the
RR n° 8237
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latter case, there is no other choice than ignoring the prediction. In the
former case, we still have the possibility to ignore the prediction, but we
may also decide to trust it: in fact the decision is randomly taken. With
probability q, we trust the predictor and take the prediction into account
(see Figures 2(f) and 2(g)), and with probability 1 − q, we ignore the
prediction (see Figures 2(d) and 2(e));
• If we take the prediction into account, we take a proactive checkpoint (of
length Cp) as late as possible, i.e., so that it completes right at the time
when the fault is predicted to happen. After this checkpoint, we complete
the execution of the period (see Figures 2(f) and 2(g));
• If we ignore the prediction, either by necessity (not enough time to take
an extra checkpoint, see Figures 2(b) and 2(c)), or or by choice (with
probability 1− q, Figures 2(d) and 2(e)), we finish the current period and
start a new one.
The rationale for not always trusting the predictor is to avoid taking useless
checkpoints too frequently. Intuitively, the precision p of the predictor must be
above a given threshold for its usage to be worthwhile. In other words, if we
decide to checkpoint just before a predicted event, either we will save time by
avoiding a costly re-execution if the event does correspond to an actual fault, or
we will lose time by unduly performing an extra checkpoint. We need a larger
proportion of the former cases, i.e., a good precision, for the predictor to be
really useful. The following analysis will determine the optimal value of q as a
function of the parameters C, Cp, µ, r, and p.
We could refine the approach by taking into account the amount of work
already done in the current period when deciding whether to trust the predictor
or not. Intuitively, the more work already done, the more important to save
it, hence the more worthwhile to trust the predictor. We design such a refined
strategy in Section 4.2. Right now, we analyze a simpler algorithm where we
decide to trust or not to trust the predictor, independently of the amount of
work done so far within the period.
We analyze the algorithm in order to compute a formula for the expected
waste, just as in Equation (12). While the value of WasteFF is unchanged
(WasteFF =
C
T ), the value of Wastefault is modified because of predictions.
As illustrated in Figure 2, there are many different scenarios that contribute to
Wastefault that can be sorted into three categories:
(1) Unpredicted faults: This overhead occurs each time an unpredicted fault
strikes, that is, on average, once every µNP seconds. Just as in Equation (7),
the corresponding waste is 1µNP
[
T
2 +D +R
]
.
(2) Predictions not taken into account: The second source of waste is for
predictions that are ignored. This overhead occurs in two different scenarios.
First, if we do not have time to take a proactive checkpoint, we have an overhead
if and only the prediction is an actual fault. This case happens with probability
p. We then lose a time t + D + R if the predicted fault happens a time t after
the completion of the last periodic checkpoint. The expected time lost is thus
T 1lost =
1
T
∫ Cp
0
(p(t+D +R) + (1− p)0) dt
RR n° 8237
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TimeT -C T -C Tlost T -C
fault
C C C D R C
(a) Unpredicted fault
TimeT -C T -C
Predicted fault
T -C T -C
C C C C C
(b) Prediction cannot be taken into account - no actual fault
TimeT -C Tlost
fault Predicted fault
T -C T -C T -C
C C D R C C C
(c) Prediction cannot be taken into account - with actual fault
TimeT -C T -C
Predicted fault
T -C T -C
C C C C C
(d) Prediction not taken into account by choice - no actual fault
TimeT -C Tlost
fault Predicted fault
T -C T -C
C C D R C C
(e) Prediction not taken into account by choice - with actual fault
TimeT -C Wreg
Predicted fault
T -Wreg -C T -C T -C
C C Cp C C C
(f) Prediction taken into account - no actual fault
TimeT -C Wreg
fault Predicted fault
T -Wreg -C T -C
C C Cp D R C C
(g) Prediction taken into account - with actual fault
Figure 2 – Actions taken for the different event types.
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Then, if we do have time to take a proactive checkpoint but still decide to ignore
the prediction, we also have an overhead if and only the prediction is an actual
fault, but the expected time lost is now weighted by the probability (1− q):
T 2lost = (1− q)
1
T
∫ T
Cp
(p(t+D +R) + (1− p)0) dt
(3) Predictions taken into account: We now compute the overhead due to
a prediction which we trust (hence we checkpoint just before its date). If the
prediction is an actual fault, we lose Cp + D + R seconds, but if it is not, we
lose the unnecessary extra checkpoint time Cp. The expected time lost is now
weighted by the probability q and becomes
T 3lost = q
1
T
∫ T
Cp
(p(Cp +D +R) + (1− p)Cp) dt
We derive the final value of Wastefault:
Wastefault =
1
µNP
[
T
2
+D +R
]
+
1
µP
[
T 1lost + T
2
lost + T
3
lost
]
This final expression comes from the disjunction of all possibles cases, using the
Law of Total Probability [17, p.23]: the waste comes either from non-predicted
faults or from predictions; in the latter case, we have analyzed the three pos-
sible sub-cases and weighted them with their respective probabilities. After
simplifications, we obtain
Wastefault =
1
µ
(
(1− rq)T
2
+D +R+
qr
p
Cp −
qrC2p
pT
(1− p/2)
)
(14)
We could now plug this expression back into Equation (11) to compute the
value of T that minimizes the total waste. Instead, we move on to describing
the refined algorithm, and we minimize the waste for the refined strategy, since
it always induces a smaller waste.
4.2 Refined policy
In this section, we refine the approach and consider different trust strategies,
depending upon the time in the period where the prediction takes place. In-
tuitively, the later in the period, the more likely we are inclined to trust the
predictor, because the amount of work that we could lose gets larger and larger.
As before, we cannot take into account a fault predicted to happen less than
Cp units of time after the beginning of the period. Therefore, we focus on what
happens in the period after time Cp. Formally, we now divide the interval [Cp, T ]
into n intervals [βi;βi+1] for i ∈ {0, · · · , n−1}, where β0 = Cp and βn = T . For
each interval [βi;βi+1], we trust the predictor with probability qi. We aim at
determining the values of n, βi, and qi that minimize the waste. As mentioned
before, intuition tells us that the qi values should be non-decreasing. We prove
below a somewhat unexpected theorem: in the optimal strategy, there is either
one or two different qi values, and these values are 0 or 1. This means that we
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should never trust the predictor in the beginning of a period, and always trust
it in the end of the period, without any intermediate behavior in between.
We formally express this striking result below. Let βlim =
Cp
p . The op-
timal strategy is provided by Theorem 1 below. We first prove the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. The values of βi and qi that minimize the waste satisfy the
following conditions:
(i) For all i such that βi+1 ≤ βlim, qi = 0.
(ii) For all i such that βi ≥ βlim, qi = 1.
Proof. First we compute the waste with the refined algorithm, using Equa-
tion (11). The formula for Wastefault is similar to Equation (14) on each
interval:
Waste =
C
T
+
(
1− C
T
)[
1
µNP
(
T
2
+D +R
)
+
1
µP
n−1∑
i=0
(
qi
∫ βi+1
βi
(p(Cp +D +R) + (1− p)Cp)
T
dt
+ (1− qi)
∫ βi+1
βi
p(t+D +R)
T
dt
)]
Now, consider a fixed value of i and express the value of Waste as a function
of qi:
Waste = K +
(
1− C
T
)
qi
µP
∫ βi+1
βi
(
Cp
T
− pt
T
)
dt
where K does not depend on qi. From the sign of the function to be integrated,
one sees that Waste is minimized when qi = 0 if βi+1 ≤ βlim = Cpp , and when
qi = 1 if βi ≥ βlim.
Theorem 1. The optimal algorithm takes proactive actions if and only if the
prediction falls in the interval [βlim, T ].
Proof. From Proposition 1, the values for qi are optimally defined for every i but
one: we do not know the optimal value if there exists i0 such that βi0 < βlim <
βi0+1. Then let us consider the waste where qi0 is replaced by q
(1)
i0
on [βi0 , βlim]
and by q
(2)
i0
on [βlim, βi0+1]. The new waste is necessarily smaller than the one
with only qi0 , since we relaxed the constraint. We know from Proposition 1 that
the optimal solution is then to have q
(1)
i0
= 0 and q
(2)
i0
= 1.
Let us now compute the value of the waste with the optimal algorithm.
There are two cases, depending upon whether T ≤ βlim or not. For values of T
smaller than βlim, Theorem 1 shows that the optimal algorithm never takes any
proactive action; in that case the waste is given by Equation (12) in Section 3.
For values of T larger than βlim =
Cp
p , we compute the waste due to predictions
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as
1
µP
1
T
(∫ Cp/p
0
p(t+D +R)dt+
∫ T
Cp/p
(p(Cp +D +R) + (1− p)Cp)dt
)
=
r
pµ
(
p(D +R) + Cp −
C2p
2pT
)
Indeed, in accordance with Theorem 1, no prediction is taken into account in
the interval [0,
Cp
p ], while all predictions are taken into account in the interval
[
Cp
p , T ]. Adding the waste due to unpredicted faults, namely
1
µNP
[
T
2 +D +R
]
,
we derive
Wastefault =
1
µ
(
(1− r)T
2
+
r
p
Cp
(
1− 1
2p
Cp
T
)
+D +R
)
.
Plugging this value into Equation (11), we obtain the total waste when
Cp
p ≤ T :
Waste =
C
T
+
1
µ
(
(1− r)T
2
+
r
p
Cp
(
1− 1
2p
Cp
T
)
+D +R
)(
1− C
T
)
=
rCC2p
2p2
1
µT 2
+
(
µC − rC
2
p
2p2
− C
(
rCp
p
+D +R
))
1
µT
+
1− r
2µ
T
+
−(1− r)C2 + rCpp +D +R
µ
Altogether, the expression for the total waste becomes:
Waste1(T ) =
C(1−D+Rµ )
T +
D+R−C/2
µ +
1
2µT if
Cp
p ≥ T
Waste2(T ) =
rCC2p
2µp2
1
T 2 +
(
C
(
1−
rCp
p
+D+R
µ
)
− rC
2
p
2µp2
)
T +
−(1−r)C2 +
rCp
p +D+R
µ +
1−r
2µ T if
Cp
p ≤ T
(15)
One can check that when r = 0 (no error predicted, hence no proactive action
in the algorithm), then Waste1 and Waste2 coincide. We also check that
both values coincide for T =
Cp
p . We show how to minimize the waste in
Equation (15) in Section 4.3.
4.3 Waste minimization
In this section we focus on minimizing the waste in Equation (15). Recall that,
by construction, we always have to enforce the constraint T ≥ C. First consider
the case where C ≤ Cpp . On the interval T ∈ [C, Cpp ], we retrieve the optimal
value found in Section 3, and derive that Waste1, the waste when predictions
are not taken into account, is minimized for
TNoPred = max
(
C,min
(
TRFO,
Cp
p
))
(16)
Indeed, the optimal value should belong to the interval [C,
Cp
p ], and the function
Waste1 is convex: if the extremal solution
√
2(µ− (D +R))C does not belong
to this interval, then the optimal value is one of the bounds of the interval.
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On the interval T ∈
[
Cp
p ,+∞
)
, we find the optimal solution by differentiat-
ing twice Waste2 with respect to T . Writing Waste2(T ) =
u
T 2 +
v
T + w + xT
for simplicity, we obtain Waste′′2(T ) =
2
T 3
(
3u
T + v
)
. Here, a key parameter is
the sign of :
v =
(
C
(
1−
rCp
p +D +R
µ
)
− rC
2
p
2µp2
)
We detail the case v ≥ 0 in the following, because it is the most frequent with
realistic parameter sets; we do have v ≥ 0 for all the whole range of simulations
in Section 5. For the sake of completeness, we will briefly discuss the case v < 0
in the comments below.
When v ≥ 0, we have Waste′′2(T ) ≥ 0, so that Waste2 is convex on the
interval
[
Cp
p ,+∞
)
and admits a unique minimum Textr. Note that Textr can be
computed either numerically or using Cardano’s method, since it is the unique
real root of a polynomial of degree 3. The optimal solution on
[
Cp
p ,+∞
)
is
then: TPred = max
(
Textr,
Cp
p
)
.
It remains to consider the case where
Cp
p < C. In fact, it suffices to add the
constraint that the value of TPred should be greater than C, that is:
TPred = max
(
C,max
(
Textr,
Cp
p
))
(17)
Finally, the optimal solution for the waste is given by the minimum of the
following two values:
C(1−D+Rµ )
TNoPred
+ D+R−C/2µ +
1
2µTNoPred
rCC2p
2µp2
1
T 2Pred
+
(
C
(
1−
rCp
p
+D+R
µ
)
− rC
2
p
2µp2
)
TPred
+
−(1−r)C2 +
rCp
p +D+R
µ +
1−r
2µ TPred
We make a few observations:
• Just as for Equation (13) in Section 3, mathematical rigor calls for capping
the values of D, R, C, Cp and T in front of the MTBF. The only difference
is that we should replace µ by µe: this is to account for the occurrence
rate of all events, be they unpredicted faults or predictions.
• While the expression of the waste looks complicated, the numerical value
of the optimal period can easily be computed in all cases. We have dealt
with the case v ≥ 0, where v is the coefficient of 1/T in Waste2(T ) =
u
T 2 +
v
T +w+xT . When v < 0 we only needs to compute all the nonnegative
real roots of a polynomial of degree 3, and check which one leads to the
best value. More precisely, these root(s) partition the admissible interval[
Cp
p ,+∞
)
into several sub-intervals, and the optimal value is either a root
or a sub-interval bound.
• In many practical situations, when µ is large enough, we can dramatically
simplify the expression of Waste2(T ): we have T = O(
√
µ), the term uT 2
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becomes negligible, checkpoint parameters become negligible in front of µ,
and we derive the approximated value
√
2µC
1−r . This value can be seen as
an extension of Equation (13) giving TRFO, where µ is replaced by
µ
1−r :
faults are replaced by non-predicted faults, and the overhead due to false
predictions is negligible. As a word of caution, recall that this conclusion
is valid only when µ is very large in front of all other parameters.
5 Simulation results
We start by presenting the simulation framework (Section 5.1). Then we report
results using synthetic traces (Section 5.2) and log-based traces (Section 5.3).
Finally, we assess the respective impact of the two key parameters of a predictor,
its recall and its precision, on checkpointing strategies (Section 5.4).
5.1 Simulation framework
Scenario generation – In order to check the accuracy of our model and of
our analysis, and to assess the potential benefits of predictors, we study the
performance of our new solutions and of pre-existing ones using a discrete-event
simulator. The simulation engine generates a random trace of faults. Given a
set of p processors, a failure trace is a set of failure dates for each processor over
a fixed time horizon h (set to 2 years). Given the distribution of inter-arrival
times at a processor, for each processor we generate a trace via independent
sampling until the target time horizon is reached. The job start time is assumed
to be one-year to avoid side-effects related to the synchronous initialization of
all nodes/processors. We consider two types of failure traces, namely synthetic
and log-based.
Synthetic failure traces – The simulation engine generates a random trace of
faults parameterized either by an Exponential fault distribution or by Weibull
distribution laws with shape parameter either 0.5 or 0.7. Note that Exponential
faults are widely used for theoretical studies, while Weibull faults are representa-
tive of the behavior of real-world platforms [18, 19, 20, 21]. For example, Heien
et al. [21] have studied the failure distribution for 6 sources of failures (stor-
age devices, NFS, batch system, memory and processor cache errors, etc.), and
the aggregate failure distribution. They have shown that the aggregate failure
distribution is best modeled by a Weibull distribution with a shape parameter
that is between 0.5841 and 0.7097.
The Jaguar platform, which comprised N = 45, 208 processors, is reported
to have experienced about one fault per day [1], which leads to an individual
(processor) MTBF µind equal to
45,208
365 ≈ 125 years. Therefore, we set the
individual (processor) MTBF to µind = 125 years. We let the total number
of processors N vary from N = 16, 384 to N = 524, 288, so that the platform
MTBF µ varies from µ = 4, 010 min (about 2.8 days) down to µ = 125 min
(about 2 hours). Whatever the underlying failure distribution, it is scaled so
that its expectation corresponds to the platform MTBF µ. The application size
is set to Timebase = 10, 000 years/N.
Log-based failure traces – To corroborate the results obtained with synthetic
failure traces, and to further assess the performance of our algorithms, we also
perform simulations using the failure logs of two production clusters. We use
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logs of the largest clusters among the preprocessed logs in the Failure trace
archive [22], i.e., for clusters at the Los Alamos National Laboratory [19]. In
these logs, each failure is tagged by the node —and not the processor— on which
the failure occurred. Among the 26 possible clusters, we opted for the logs of
the only two clusters with more than 1,000 nodes. The motivation is that we
need a sample history sufficiently large to simulate platforms with more than
ten thousand nodes. The two chosen logs are for clusters 18 (LANL18) and
19 (LANL19) in the archive (referred to as 7 and 8 in [19]). For each log, we
record the set S of availability intervals. The discrete failure distribution for the
simulation is generated as follows: the conditional probability P(X ≥ t | X ≥ τ)
that a node stays up for a duration t, knowing that it has been up for a duration
τ , is set to the ratio of the number of availability durations in S greater than or
equal to t, over the number of availability durations in S greater than or equal
to τ .
The two clusters used for computing our log-based failure distributions con-
sist of 4-processor nodes. Hence, to simulate a platform of, say, 216 processors,
we generate 214 failure traces, one for each 4-processor node. In the logs the
individual (processor) MTBF is µind = 691 days for the LANL18 cluster, and
µind = 679 days for the LANL19 cluster. The LANL18 and LANL19 traces are
logs for systems which comprised 4,096 processors. Using these logs to generate
traces for a system made of 524, 288 processors, as the largest platforms we
consider with synthetic failure traces, would lead to an obvious risk of oversam-
pling. Therefore, we limit the size of the log-based traces we generate: we let
the total number of processors N varies from N = 1, 024 to N = 131, 072, so
that the platform MTBF µ varies from µ = 971 min (about 16 hours) down to
µ = 7.5 min. The application size is set to Timebase = 250 years/N.
Predicted failures and false predictions – Once we have generated a failure
trace, we need to determine which faults are predicted and which are not. In
order to do so, we consider all faults in a trace one by one. For each of them,
we randomly decide, with probability r, whether it is predicted.
We use the simulation engine to generate a random trace of false predictions.
The main problem is to decide the shape of the distribution that false predictions
should follow. To the best of our knowledge, no published study ever addressed
that problem. For synthetic failure traces, we report results when false pre-
dictions follow the same distribution than faults (except, of course, that both
distributions do not have the same mean value). In B, we report on simulations
when false predictions are generated according to a uniform distribution; the
results are quite similar. For log-based failures, we only report results when
false predictions are generated according to a uniform distribution (because we
believe that scaling down a discrete, actual distribution may not be meaningful).
The distribution of false predictions is always scaled so that its expectation
is equal to µP1−p =
pµ
r(1−p) , the inter-arrival time of false predictions. Finally,
the failure trace and the false-prediction trace are merged to produce the final
trace including all events (true predictions, false predictions, and non predicted
faults). Each reported value is the average over 100 randomly generated in-
stances.
Checkpointing, recovery, and downtime costs – The experiments use
parameters that are representative of current and forthcoming large-scale plat-
forms [23, 24]. We take C = R = 10 min, and D = 1 min for the synthetic failure
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traces. For the log-based traces we consider smaller platforms. Therefore, we
take C = R = 1 min, and D = 6s. Whatever the trace, we consider three sce-
narios for the proactive checkpoints: either proactive checkpoints are (i) exactly
as expensive as periodic ones (Cp = C), (ii) ten times cheaper (Cp = 0.1C), and
(iii) two times more expensive (Cp = 2C).
Heuristics – In the simulations, we compare four checkpointing strategies:
• RFO is the checkpointing strategy of period T =
√
2(µ− (D +R))C (see
Section 3).
• OptimalPrediction is the refined algorithm described in Section 4.2.
• To assess the quality of each strategy, we compare it with its BestPeriod
counterpart, defined as the same strategy but using the best possible pe-
riod T . This latter period is computed via a brute-force numerical search
for the optimal period (each tested period is evaluated on 100 randomly
generated traces, and the period achieving the best average performance
is elected as the “best period”).
Fault predictors – We experiment using the characteristics of two predictors
from the literature: one accurate predictor with high recall and precision [7],
namely with p = 0.82 and r = 0.85, and another predictor with intermediate
recall and precision [8], namely with p = 0.4 and r = 0.7.
In practice, a predictor will not be able to predict the exact time at which a
predicted fault will strike the system. Therefore, in the simulations, when a pre-
dictor predicts that a failure will strike the system at a date t (true prediction),
the failure actually occurs exactly at time t for heuristic OptimalPrediction,
and between time t and time t + 2C for heuristic InexactPrediction (the
probability of fault is uniformly distributed in the time-interval). Optimal-
Prediction can thus be seen as a best case. The comparison between Opti-
malPrediction and InexactPrediction enables us to assess the impact of
the time imprecision of predictions, and to show that the obtained results are
quite robust to this type of imprecision. The choice of an interval length of 2C
is quite arbitrary. For synthetic traces, this corresponds to 1,200 s, which is
quite a significant imprecision.
5.2 Simulations with synthetic traces
Figures 3 and 4 show the average waste degradation for the two checkpointing
policies, and for their BestPeriod counterparts, for both predictors. The waste
is reported as a function of the number of processors N . We draw the plots as
a function of the number of processors N rather than of the platform MTBF
µ = µind/N , because it is more natural to see the waste increase with larger
platforms. However, recall that this work is agnostic of the granularity of the
processing elements and intrinsically focuses on the impact of the MTBF on the
waste.
We also report job execution times, in Table 3 when fault distribution follows
an Exponential distribution law, and in Tables 4 and 5 for a Weibull distribution
law with shape parameter k = 0.7 and k = 0.5 respectively.
Validation of the theoretical study – We used Maple to analytically com-
pute and plot the optimal value of the waste for both the algorithm taking
predictions into account, OptimalPrediction, and for the algorithm ignoring
them, RFO. In order to check the accuracy of our model, we have compared
these results with results obtained with the discrete-event simulator.
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We first observe that there is a very good correspondence between analytical
results and simulations in Figures 3 and 4. In particular, the Maple plots and
the simulations for Exponentially distributed faults are very similar. This shows
the validity of the model and of its analysis. Another striking result is that
OptimalPrediction has the same waste as its BestPeriod counterpart, even
for Weibull fault distributions, in all but the most extreme cases. In the other
cases, the waste achieved by OptimalPrediction is very close to that of its
BestPeriod counterpart. This demonstrates the very good quality of our
checkpointing period TPred. These conclusions are valid regardless of the cost
ratio of periodic and proactive checkpoints.
In Tables 3 through 5 we report the execution times obtained when using
the expression of T given by Young [9] and Daly [10] (denoted respectively as
Young and Daly) to assess whether TRFO is a better approximation. (Re-
call that these three approaches ignore the predictions, which explains why the
numbers are identical on both sides of each table.) The expressions of T given
by Young, Daly, and RFO are identical for Exponential distributions and
the three heuristics achieve the same performance (Table 3). This confirms the
analytical evaluation of Table 2 in Section 3. For Weibull distributions (Ta-
bles 4 and 5), RFO achieves lower makespan, and the difference becomes even
more significant as the size of the platform increases. Moreover, it is striking to
observe in Table 5 that job execution time increases together with the number
for processors (from N = 216 to N = 219) if the checkpointing period is Daly
or Young. On the contrary, job execution time (rightfully) decreases when
using RFO, even if the decrease is moderate with respect to the increase of the
platform size. Altogether, the main (striking) conclusion is that RFO should
be preferred to both classical approaches for Weibull distributions.
The benefits of prediction – The second observation is that the prediction
is useful for the vast majority of the set of parameters under study! In addition,
when proactive checkpoints are cheaper than periodic ones, the benefits of fault
prediction are increased. On the contrary, when proactive checkpoints are more
expensive than periodic ones, the benefits of fault prediction are greatly reduced.
One can even observe that the waste with prediction is not better than without
prediction in the following scenario: Cp = 2C, and using the limited-quality
predictor (p = 0.4, r = 0.7) with 219 processors, see Figures 4(i),(j),(k), and (l).
In Tables 3 through 5 we compute the gain (expressed in percentage) achieved
by OptimalPrediction over RFO. As a general trend, we observe that the
gains due to predictions are more important when the distribution law is fur-
ther apart from an Exponential distribution. Indeed, the largest gains are when
the fault distribution follows a Weibull law of parameter 0.5. Using Optimal-
Prediction in conjunction with a “good” fault predictor we report gains up
to 66% when there is a large number of processors (219). The gain is still of
37% with 216 processors. Using a predictor with limited recall and precision,
OptimalPrediction can still decrease the execution time by 47% with 219
processors, and 31% with 216 processors. In all tested cases, the decrease of
the execution times is significant. Gains are less important with Weibull laws
of shape parameter k = 0.7, however they are still reaching a minimum of 13%
with 216 processors, and up to 38% with 219 processors. Finally, gains are fur-
ther reduced with an Exponential law. They are still reaching at least 5% with
216 processors, and up to 19% with 219 processors.
The performance of InexactPrediction shows that using a fault predictor
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(l) Weibull k = 0.5
Figure 3 – Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the platform
size (x-axis), with p = 0.82, r = 0.85, Cp = C (first row), Cp = 0.1C (second
row), or Cp = 2C (third row) and with a trace of false predictions parametrized
by a distribution identical to the distribution of the failure trace.
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(h) Weibull k = 0.5
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218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(l) Weibull k = 0.5
Figure 4 – Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the platform
size (x-axis), with p = 0.4, r = 0.7, Cp = C (first row), Cp = 0.1C (second row),
or Cp = 2C (third row) and with a trace of false predictions parametrized by a
distribution identical to the distribution of the failure trace.
RR n° 8237
Checkpointing algorithms and fault prediction 23
remains largely beneficial even in the presence of large uncertainties on the time
the predicted faults will actually occur (see Tables 3, 4, and 5). When N = 216
the degradation with respect to OptimalPrediction is of 3% for a Weibull
law with shape parameter k = 0.7, and the minimum gain over RFO is still of
10%. When the shape parameter of the Weibull law is k = 0.5, the degradation
is of 7% when, for a minimum gain of 26% over RFO.
Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
216 procs 219 procs 216 procs 219 procs
Young 65.2 11.7 65.2 11.7
Daly 65.2 11.8 65.2 11.8
RFO 65.2 11.7 65.2 11.7
OptimalPrediction 60.0 (8%) 9.5 (19%) 61.7 (5%) 10.7 (8%)
InexactPrediction 60.6 (7%) 10.2 (13%) 62.3 (4%) 11.4 (3%)
Table 3 – Job execution times for an Exponential distribution, and gains due to
the fault predictor (with respect to the performance of RFO).
Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
216 procs 219 procs 216 procs 219 procs
Young 81.3 30.1 81.3 30.1
Daly 81.4 31.0 81.4 31.0
RFO 80.3 25.5 80.3 25.5
OptimalPrediction 65.9 (18%) 15.9 (38%) 69.7 (13%) 20.2 (21%)
InexactPrediction 68.0 (15%) 20.3 (20%) 72.0 (10%) 24.6 (4%)
Table 4 – Job execution times for a Weibull distribution with shape parameter
k = 0.7, and gains due to the fault predictor (with respect to the performance
of RFO).
Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
216 procs 219 procs 216 procs 219 procs
Young 125.5 171.8 125.5 171.8
Daly 125.8 184.7 125.8 184.7
RFO 120.2 114.8 120.2 114.8
OptimalPrediction 75.9 (37%) 39.5 (66%) 83.0 (31%) 60.8 (47%)
InexactPrediction 82.0 (32%) 60.8 (47%) 89.4 (26%) 76.6 (33%)
Table 5 – Job execution times for a Weibull distribution with shape parameter
k = 0.5, and gains due to the fault predictor (with respect to the performance
of RFO).
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5.3 Simulations with log-based traces
Figure 5 shows the average waste degradation for the two checkpointing policies,
and for their BestPeriod counterparts, for both predictors, both traces, and
the three scenarios for proactive checkpoints. Tables 6 and 7 present job ex-
ecution times for RFO, OptimalPrediction, and InexactPrediction, for
both traces and for platform sizes smaller than as the ones reported in Tables 3
through 5 for synthetic traces. The waste for RFO is closer to its BestPeriod
counterpart with log-based traces than with Weibull-based traces. As a conse-
quence, when prediction with OptimalPrediction is beneficial, it is beneficial
with respect to both RFO, and to RFO’s BestPeriod.
Overall, we observe similar results and reach the same conclusions with log-
based traces as with synthetic ones. The waste of OptimalPrediction is very
close to that of its BestPeriod counterpart for platforms containing up to 216
processors. This demonstrates the validity of our analysis for the actual traces
considered. The waste of OptimalPrediction is often significantly larger than
that of its BestPeriod counterpart for platforms containing 217 processors.
The problem with the largest considered platforms may be due to oversampling.
Indeed, the original logs recorded events for platforms comprising only 4,096
processors and respectively contained only 3,010 and 2,343 availability intervals.
As with synthetic failure traces, prediction turns out to be useful for the
vast majority of tested configurations. The only cases when prediction is not
useful is with the “bad” predictor (r = 0.7 and p = 0.4), when the cost of
proactive checkpoint is larger than the cost of periodic checkpoints (Cp = 2C),
and when considering the largest of platforms (N = 217). This extreme case is,
however, the only one for which prediction is not beneficial. It is not surprising
that predictions are not useful when there are a lot of false predictions that
require the use of expensive proactive actions. Looking at Tables 6 and 7, one
could remark that performance gains due to the predictions are similar to the
ones observed with Exponential-based traces, and are significantly smaller than
the ones observed with Weibull-based traces. However, recall that we remarked
that gains increase with the size of the platform, and that we consider smaller
platforms when using log-based traces.
Finally, the imprecision related to the time where predicted faults strike,
induces a performance degradation. However, this degradation is rather limited
for the most efficient of the two predictors considered, or when the platform size
is not too large.
Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
214 procs 217 procs 214 procs 217 procs
RFO 26.8 4.88 26.8 4.88
OptimalPrediction 24.4 (9%) 3.89 (20%) 25.2 (6%) 4.44 (9%)
InexactPrediction 24.7 (8%) 4.20 (14%) 25.5 (5%) 4.73 (3%)
Table 6 – Job execution times with failures based on the failure log of LANL18
cluster, and gains due to the fault predictor (with respect to the performance
of RFO).
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Figure 5 – Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the platform
size (x-axis) with failures based on the failure log of LANL clusters 18 and 19.
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Execution time (in days) Execution time (in days)
Cp = C (p = 0.82, r = 0.85) (p = 0.4, r = 0.7)
214 procs 217 procs 214 procs 217 procs
RFO 26.8 4.86 26.8 4.86
OptimalPrediction 24.4 (9%) 3.85 (21%) 25.2 (6%) 4.42 (9%)
InexactPrediction 24.6 (8%) 4.14 (15%) 25.4 (5%) 4.71 (3%)
Table 7 – Job execution times with failures based on the failure log of LANL19
cluster, and gains due to the fault predictor (with respect to the performance
of RFO).
5.4 Recall vs. precision
In this section, we assess the impact of the two key parameters of the predictor,
its recall r and its precision p. To this purpose, we conduct simulations with syn-
thetic traces, where one parameter is fixed while the other varies. We choose two
platforms, a smaller one with N = 216 processors (or a MTBF µ = 1, 000 min)
and a larger one with N = 219 processors (or a MTBF µ = 125 min). In both
cases we study the impact of the predictor characteristics assuming a Weibull
fault distribution with shape parameter either 0.5 or 0.7, under the scenario
Cp = C.
In Figures 6 and 7, we fix the value of r (either r = 0.4 or r = 0.8) and
we let p vary from 0.3 to 0.99. In the four plots, we observe that the precision
has a minor impact on the waste, whether it is with a Weibull distribution of
shape parameter 0.7 (Figure 6), or a Weibull distribution of shape parameter
0.5 (Figure 7). In Figures 8 and 9, we conduct the converse experiment and fix
the value of p (either p = 0.4 or p = 0.8), letting r vary from 0.3 to 0.99. Here
we observe that increasing the recall significantly improves performance, in all
but one configuration. In the configuration where improving the recall does not
make a (significant) difference, there is a very large number of faults and a low
precision, hence a large number of false predictions which negatively impact the
performance whatever the value of the recall.
Altogether we conclude that it is more important (for the design of future
predictors) to focus on improving the recall r rather than the precision p, and our
results can help quantify this statement. We provide an intuitive explanation as
follows: unpredicted faults prove very harmful and heavily increase the waste,
while unduly checkpointing due to false predictions (usually) turns out to induce
a smaller overhead.
6 Related work
Considerable research has been devoted to fault prediction, using very different
models (system log analysis [7], event-driven approach [4, 7, 8], support vector
machines [6, 3], nearest neighbors [6], etc). In this section we give a brief
overview of existing predictors, focusing on their characteristics rather than on
the methods of prediction. For the sake of clarity, we sum up the characteristics
of the different fault predictors from the literature in Table 8.
The authors of [8] introduce the lead time, that is the duration between
the time the prediction is made and the time the predicted fault is supposed
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Figure 6 – Waste (y-axis) as a function of the precision (x-axis) for a fixed
recall (r = 0.4 and r = 0.8) and for a Weibull distribution of faults (with shape
parameter k = 0.7).
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Figure 7 – Waste (y-axis) as a function of the precision (x-axis) for a fixed
recall (r = 0.4 and r = 0.8) and for a Weibull distribution of faults (with shape
parameter k = 0.5).
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Figure 8 – Waste (y-axis) as a function of the recall (x-axis) for a fixed precision
(p = 0.4 and p = 0.8) and for a Weibull distribution (k=0.7).
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Figure 9 – Waste (y-axis) as a function of the recall (x-axis) for a fixed precision
(p = 0.4 and p = 0.8) and for a Weibull distribution (k=0.5).
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Paper Lead Time Precision Recall
[8] 300 s 40 % 70 %
[8] 600 s 35 % 60 %
[7] 2h 64.8 % 65.2 %
[7] 0 min 82.3 % 85.4 %
[4] 32 s 93 % 43 %
[5] 10s 92 % 40 %
[5] 60s 92 % 20 %
[5] 600s 92 % 3 %
[3] NA 70 % 75 %
[6] NA 20 % 30 %
[6] NA 30 % 75 %
[6] NA 40 % 90 %
[6] NA 50 % 30 %
[6] NA 60 % 85 %
Table 8 – Comparative study of different parameters returned by some predic-
tors.
to happen. This time should be sufficiently large to enable proactive actions.
As already mentioned, the distribution of lead times is irrelevant. Indeed, only
predictions whose lead time is greater than Cp, the time to take a proactive
checkpoint, are meaningful. Predictions whose lead time is smaller than Cp,
whenever they materialize as actual faults, should be classified as unpredicted
faults; the predictor recall should be decreased accordingly.
The predictor of [8] is also able to locate where the predicted fault is supposed
to strike. This additional characteristics has a negative impact on the precision
(because a fault happening at the predicted time but not on the predicted
location is classified as a non predicted fault; see the low value of p in Table 8).
The authors of [8] state that fault localization has a positive impact on proactive
checkpointing time in their context: instead of a full checkpoint costing 1, 500
seconds they can take a partial checkpoint costing only 12 seconds. This led us
to introduce a different cost Cp for proactive checkpoints, that can be smaller
than the cost C of regular checkpoints. Gainaru et al. [5] also stated that fault-
localization could help decrease the checkpointing time. Their predictor also
gives information on fault localization. They studied the impact of different
lead times on the recall of their predictor. Papers [7] and [6] also considered
lead times.
Most studies on fault prediction state that a proactive action must be taken
right before the predicted fault, be it a checkpoint or a migration. However, we
have shown in this paper that it is beneficial to ignore some predictions, namely
when the predicted fault is announced to strike less than
Cp
p seconds after the
last periodic checkpoint.
Gainaru et al. [5] studied the impact of prediction on the checkpointing
period. Their computation of the total waste is not fully accurate and they
do not provide any minimization analysis. Instead, they only propose to use
Young’s formula, replacing the MTBF by the mean-time of unpredicted faults.
They do not question whether all predictions should be taken into account.
Furthermore, they did not conduct any simulations; instead they analytically
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computed the ratio of the waste with and without predictions and instantiated
the corresponding formula with several scenarios.
Li et al. [25] considered the mathematical problem of when and how to mi-
grate. In order to be able to use migration, they assumed that at any time 2% of
the resources are available as spares. This allows them to conceive a Knapsack-
based heuristic. Thanks to their algorithm, they were able to save 30% of the
execution time compared to a heuristic that does not take the prediction into
account, with a precision and recall of 70%, and with a maximum load of 0.7.
In our study we do not consider that we have a batch of spare resources. We
assume that after a downtime the resources that failed are once again available.
Note that some authors [7, 6] do not consider that their predictors predict
the exact time of the fault. On the contrary, they consider a “prediction win-
dow” which is the time interval in which the predicted is supposed to occur.
Because most papers focus on prediction windows of negligible length, we did
not consider prediction windows in this study.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to focus on the
mathematical aspect of fault prediction, and to provide a model and a detailed
analysis of the waste due to all three types of events (true and false predictions
and unpredicted failures).
7 Conclusion
In this work we have studied the impact of fault prediction on periodic check-
pointing. We started by revisiting the first-order approach by Young and Daly.
We have performed a refined analysis leading to a better checkpointing period:
TRFO is slightly closer to the optimal period for Exponential distributions (the
only case where the optimal is known), and leads to smaller execution times for
Weibull distributions (as shown in Section 5.2).
Then we have extended the analysis to include fault predictions. We have
established analytical conditions stating whether a fault prediction should be
taken into account or not. More importantly, we have proven that the optimal
approach is to never trust the predictor in the beginning of a regular period,
and to always trust it in the end of the period; the cross-over point
Cp
p depends
on the time to take a proactive checkpoint and on the precision of the predictor.
This striking result is somewhat unexpected, as one might have envisioned more
trust regimes, with several intermediate trust levels smoothly evolving from a
“never trust” policy to an “always trust” one.
We have conducted simulations involving synthetic failure traces following
either an Exponential distribution law or a Weibull one. We have also used
log-based failure traces. In addition, we have used exact prediction dates and
uncertainty intervals for these dates. Through this extensive experiment setting,
we have established the accuracy of the model, of its analysis, and of the pre-
dicted period (in the presence of a fault predictor). The simulations also show
that even a not-so-good fault predictor can lead to quite a significant decrease
in the application execution time. We have also shown that the most impor-
tant characteristic of a fault predictor is its recall (the percentage of actually
predicted faults) rather than its precision (the percentage of predictions that
actually correspond to faults): better safe than sorry, or better prepare for a
false event than miss an actual failure!
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Altogether, the analytical model and the comprehensive results provided in
this work enable to fully assess the impact of fault prediction on optimal check-
pointing strategies. Future work will be devoted to the study of the impact
of fault prediction on uncoordinated or hierarchical checkpointing protocols.
Another challenging problem is to determine the best trade-off between perfor-
mance and energy consumption when combining several resilience techniques
such as checkpointing, prediction, and replication.
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A
For the sake of completeness, we provide a proof of the following result:
Proposition 2. Consider a platform comprising N components, and assume
that the inter-arrival times of the faults on the components are independent and
identically distributed random variables that follow an arbitrary probability law
whose expectation is µind. Then the expectation of the inter-arrival times of the
faults on the whole platform is µ = µindN .
Proof. Consider first a single component, say component number q. Let Xi,
i ≥ 0 denote the IID random variables for fault inter-arrival times on that
component, with E (Xi) = µind. Consider a fixed time bound F . Let nq(F )
be the number of faults on the component until time F is exceeded. In other
words, the (nq(F )− 1)-th fault is the last one to happen strictly before time F ,
and the nq(F )-th fault is the first to happen at time F or after. By definition
of nq(F ), we have
nq(F )−1∑
i=1
Xi ≤ F ≤
nq(F )∑
i=1
Xi
Using Wald’s equation [26, p. 486], with nq(F ) as a stopping criterion, we
derive:
(E (nq(F ))− 1)µind ≤ F ≤ E (nq(F ))µind
and we obtain:
lim
F→+∞
E (nq(F ))
F
=
1
µind
(18)
Consider now the whole platform, and let Yi, i ≥ 0 denote the IID random
variables for fault inter-arrival times on the platform, with E (Yi) = µ. Consider
a fixed time bound F as before. Let n(F ) be the number of faults on the whole
platform until time F is exceeded. With the same reasoning for the whole
platform as for a single component, we derive:
lim
F→+∞
E (n(F ))
F
=
1
µ
(19)
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Now let mq(F ) be the number of these faults that strike component number q.
Of course we have n(F ) =
∑N
q=1mq(F ). By definition, except for the component
hit by the last failure, mq(F ) + 1 is the number of failures on component q until
time F is exceeded, hence nq(F ) = mq(F ) + 1 (and this number is mq(F ) =
nq(F ) on the component hit by the last failure). From Equation (18) again, we
have for each component q:
lim
F→+∞
E (mq(F ))
F
=
1
µind
Since n(F ) =
∑N
q=1mq(F ), we also have:
lim
F→+∞
E (n(F ))
F
=
N
µind
(20)
Equations (19) and (20) lead to the result.
B
In this section, we provide results for synthetic failure traces when false predic-
tions are generated according to a uniform distribution.
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Figure 10 – Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the plat-
form size (x-axis), with p = 0.82, r = 0.85, Cp = C (first row), Cp = 0.1C
(second row), or Cp = 2C (third row) and with a trace of false predictions
parametrized by a uniform distribution.
RR n° 8237
Checkpointing algorithms and fault prediction 35
(a) Maple
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(b) Exponential
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(c) Weibull k = 0.7
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(d) Weibull k = 0.5
(e) Maple
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(f) Exponential
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(g) Weibull k = 0.7
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(h) Weibull k = 0.5
(i) Maple
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(j) Exponential
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(k) Weibull k = 0.7
218 219216 217215214
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(l) Weibull k = 0.5
Figure 11 – Waste (y-axis) for the different heuristics as a function of the plat-
form size (x-axis), with p = 0.4, r = 0.7, Cp = C (first row), Cp = 0.1C (second
row), or Cp = 2C (third row) and with a trace of false predictions parametrized
by a uniform distribution..
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